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propriate judicial policy in this area.e9
V. CONCLUSION
In finding that section 6010 of the Developmentally Dis-
abled Act does not create in favor of the mentally retarded
any substantive rights to appropriate treatment in the least
restrictive environment, the Supreme Court not only ignored
a large body of lower court cases but avoided deciding the
constitutional issues involved.
Backlash against deinstitutionalization may develop as
economy cuts make it difficult to provide more and better ser-
vices for the mentally disabled.70 The Pennhurst decision will
be viewed by many as an abdication of the judiciary's respon-
sibility to protect the rights of this vulnerable and powerless
group.
FAYE L. CALVEY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Access to Trials -
States Have the Authority to Experiment With Me-
dia Coverage of Their Criminal Trials Without the
Defendant's Consent. Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct.
802 (1981). The United States Supreme Court unani-
mously" decided in Chandler v. Florida2 that Florida's pro-
gram s which allowed electronic media coverage 4 of criminal
69. Schoenfeld, A Survey of the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Retarded,
32 S.W.L.J. 605 (1978).
70. Friedman, supra note 29.
1. Justice Stevens did not participate in this decision.
2. 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981).
3. In In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 347 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1977), the
Florida Supreme Court revised In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 327 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1976) which had required the participants' consent so as to allow a one year
experiment in which the electronic media could televise and photograph judicial pro-
ceedings without the consent of participants. Florida's revised Canon 3A(7) was the
ultimate result of this experiment. The Florida Supreme Court established guidelines
for standards of conduct and technology to govern electronic media coverage of court
proceedings in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 347 So. 2d 404 (Fla.
1977).
4. The ruling in Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981) included television,
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proceedings without the defendant's consent, was not a viola-
tion of a defendant's due process rights.5 The Court held that
without a showing of prejudice of constitutional dimension, it
had no authority to interfere with a state's experiment in this
area' and that such experimentation was not unconstitu-
tional. After considering the risks to a fair trial created by
electronic media coverage, the Court ruled that "an absolute
constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be
justified .... ",8 However, this was not intended to be a judi-
cial endorsement or mandate of such coverage.
I. THE DECISION
The Chandler defendants were convicted of conspiracy to
commit a felony burglary, grand larceny and possession of
burglary tools." Under Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct Ca-
non 3A(7),10 parts of the trial were televised live locally. Dur-
ing the trial, the defendants challenged this canon on the
ground that such coverage prevented a fair trial. The chal-
lenges were overruled, and requests to exclude live television
coverage were denied, as were requests to sequester the jury.
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction,
but refused to consider the validity of Canon 3A(7),1" certify-
radio, and still photographic coverage. For the purpose of this article these will be
referred to as electronic equipment.
5. Due process rights are provided by the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution which states, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. 101 S. Ct. at 813-14.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 810.
9. Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
10. Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) was promulgated in the fol-
lowing series of court decisions: In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 327 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1976), modified, 337 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1976), modified, 347 So. 2d 402 (Fla.
1977), modified, 347 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1977). Ultimately Canon 3A(7) was reviewed,
modified, and made a permanent rule. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc.,
370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). The appendices following the most recent decision in the
case give the specific guidelines for such coverage and background information on the
current state of this rule in other jurisdictions. Id. at 783-94.
11. The Florida Supreme Court had revised Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct (A.B.A. 1972), which had generally prohibited the electronic media from live
coverage of judicial proceedings. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.
2d 764, 781 (Fla. 1979); Florida's revised Canon 3A(7) provided: "Subject at all times
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ing the question of its constitutionality to the Florida Su-
preme Court. The Florida Supreme Court denied review,
holding that the appeal involved a moot issue because of its
recent decision in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida,
Inc.12 which amended Canon 3A(7)1' to allow electronic media
coverage of courtroom proceedings. Certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court to determine whether such
coverage over defendants' objections violated due process
rights.
The United States Supreme Court's majority felt this to be
a case of first impression 14 because Estes v. Texas 5 did not
establish that electronic media coverage of criminal proceed-
ings was unconstitutional."' In separate concurring opinions in
Chandler, Justices Byron White and Potter Stewart differed
from the majority, arguing that Estes did establish a constitu-
tional prohibition against electronic media coverage of trials
and therefore had to be expressly overruled.
The prime concern in Chandler was assuring the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial. The Court was concerned that
electronic media coverage could create general psychological
prejudice, 8 "adversely affect the conduct of the partici-
pants,"1 9 and increase the number of appeals.20 The Court was
particularly sensitive to the potential of denying a fair trial
because the Florida experiment allowed such coverage without
to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the conduct of proceedings
before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and (iii) ensure the
fair administration of justice in the pending case, electronic media and still photogra-
phy coverage of public judicial proceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this
state shall be allowed in accordance with standards of conduct and technology
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida."
12. 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
13. See note 11 supra.
14. 101 S. Ct. at 809.
15. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
16. 101 S. Ct. at 809.
17. Id.
18. The Court was concerned with the possibility that the mere presence of the
press and their equipment could create a prejudicial atmosphere. Id. at 810.
19. Id. at 811. The. Court was concerned that "awareness by the accused of the
coverage and contemplated broadcast" would prejudicially affect the participants'
conduct and thus the fairness of the trial.
20. By adding a new basis for reversal the Court postulated appeals might be in-
creased. Id.
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the defendant's consent.21 However, the Court said these risks
and concerns cannot justify "an absolute constitutional ban
on broadcast coverage."2 2 A defendant's due process rights
were safeguarded by pre-trial hearing procedures, 23 a record
for appellate review, 24 and carefully delineated guidelines for
the press and the trial judge.25
In addition, the Court held that the defendants' due pro-
cess rights had not been violated because "[n]othing of the
'Roman circus' or 'Yankee Stadium' atmosphere, as in Estes,
prevailed here, . ..nor have appellants attempted to show
that the unsequestered jury was exposed to 'sensational' cov-
erage, in the sense of Estes or of Sheppard v. Maxwell
")26
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Chandler, the Supreme Court was confronted with the
narrow issue of whether Florida's rule allowing electronic me-
dia coverage of criminal proceedings regardless of defendant's
objection was unconstitutional. A consideration implicit in
making that judgment was the problem of safeguarding the
defendant's sixth amendment 27 right to a fair trial, a right
which has been found to apply to state judicial actions
21. Florida is one of the few states which does not require the defendant's consent
to broadcast coverage, and therefore potentially presents unique problems. Id.
22. Based on the possibility that prejudice of the jury may sometimes occur due
to broadcast coverage, the Court held that an absolute ban was not justifiable. Id. at
810.
23. A pre-trial hearing provides a forum for the defendant's objection and allows
the trial court to establish procedures to minimize or eliminate prejudice to the de-
fendant. Id. at 811.
24. A record for appellate review is created by Florida's rule which requires that a
defendant's objections to coverage be placed on the trial court's record. Id.
25. Id. Special precautions are taken to protect vulnerable witnesses like children
in accordance with the following standard:
The presiding judge may exclude electronic media coverage of a particular par-
ticipant only upon a finding that such coverage will have a substantial effect
upon the particular individual which would be qualitatively different from the
effect on members of the public in general and such effect will be qualitatively
different from coverage by other types of media.
In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 779 (Fla. 1979).
26. 101 S. Ct. at 813.
27. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted.. .."
1981]
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through the fourteenth amendment."8
The simultaneous achievement of a fair and open trial
often involves a conflict between the potential prejudice of
trial publicity" and the press' and public's right of access.30
Underlying the press' right of access are first amendment
rights,31 which, though not directly addressed by the Chandler
Court, are essential to any understanding of this case and,
with the sixth amendment's guarantee of a public trial, secure
the public's right of access to judicial proceedings.2
Historically, the sixth amendment has been viewed as re-
quiring open civil and criminal proceedings.3 Whether this
right reaches constitutional dimensions has often been de-
bated.3 The desire to educate and inform the public of the
court's proper functioning 5 must be balanced against protect-
ing and guaranteeing fair treatment of the accused.3 6 Central
to the sixth amendment is the concern that secret tribunals
would be instruments of oppression 87 and that denial of public
and press access would constitute censorship.3 8
The issue of whether a defendant's due process rights have
been violated has often revolved around whether the causal
link between prejudice and publicity must actually be proven
or whether it can be inferred.39 In Chandler, the Court placed
28. See note 3 supra.
29. See Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760 (D. Colo.), a f'd, 402 F.2d 394 (10th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
30. Compare Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) with Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
31. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
32. Note, The Public, The Media and The Criminal Defendant: Access to Court-
rooms Prevails Over Fears of Prejudicial Publicity, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 245, 252
(1981).
33. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980); Gannett
Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 385 (1979).
34. Compare Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) with Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
35. State v. Schmid, 109 Ariz. 349, -, 509 P.2d 619, 624 (1973); In re Hearings
Concerning Canon 35, - Colo. -, 296 P.2d 465, 469 (1956); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d
734, 742 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
36. 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965).
37. Id. at 539.
38. See Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, - Mont. -, 608 P.2d 116, 119
(1979).
39. Compare Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) and Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965) with Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
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the burden of proving actual prejudice upon the defendant,40
because few jurors can be found today who are ignorant of
celebrated cases. Technological advances in news dissemina
tion have reduced juror ignorance. 41 However, the mere exis-
tence of any such knowledge does not rebut the presumption
of juror impartiality or establish prejudice.2
Although the press enjoys no constitutional right of special
access to information,43 the Court noted in Craig v. Harney
that "[a] trial is a public event. What transpires in the court-
room is public property.... There is no special prerequisite
of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other
institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or
censor events which transpire in proceedings before it."'44 The
press must be given the same access rights as the general pub-
lic to criminal proceedings. To make these rights meaningful
in the case of the electronic media,45 photographers and tele-
vision representatives should have the same courtroom privi-
leges as other members of the press. 46 This view is central to
the Chandler decision.
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
Chandler is the most recent in a series of Supreme Court
cases which balance the defendants' right to a fair trial with
the potential prejudice created by public and press access to
judicial proceedings. 7 Central to the Court's decision is an
analysis of Estes v. Texas.48 Estes was found guilty after a
trial of great notoriety which was televised and broadcast over
the defendant's objection. The Supreme Court held that the
40. 101 S. Ct. at 810, 813.
41. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Great Falls Tribune v. Dist.
Ct., etc., 608 P.2d 116 (Mont. 1979).
42. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723
(1961); State v. Schmid, 109 Ariz. 349, 509 P.2d 619, 622 (1973).
43. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972).
44. 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1974).
45. See Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (including motion pic-
tures in "press"); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938). There can be no
doubt that "press" includes the electronic media.
46. Lyles v. State, - Okla. at -, 330 P.2d at 741.
47. This conflict has been variously denominated as the fair trial - free press con-
flict or the first versus sixth amendment as applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.
48. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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televised coverage of criminal proceedings violated the defen-
dant's due process rights49 on three grounds:
(1) that the televising of trials diverts the trial from its
proper purpose in that it has an inevitable impact on all the
trial participants; (2) that it gives the public the wrong im-
pression about the purpose of trials, thereby detracting from
the dignity of court proceedings and lessening the reliability
of trials; and (3) that it singles out certain defendants and
subjects them to trials under prejudicial conditions not ex-
perienced by others.50
The Court made this decision without a showing of actual
prejudice even though the jury was sequestered and a change
of venue was granted."' Although forbidding courtroom televi-
sion impinged on the states' rights,52 the Court held that the
electronic media did not have a constitutional right to cover
judicial proceedings.5 In fact, it said such coverage violated
"the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 4 The only rele-
vant constitutional consideration was that the accused be
given a fair trial.5 The Court found that television detracts
from that right because of its effect on trial participants even
when its equipment is relatively unobtrusive.56
Justice Harlan, in a concurring* opinion, maintained that
even though television coverage had violated Estes' due pro-
cess rights, it was not unconstitutional per se.57 Harlan noted
that at that time television was a novelty and still in the de-
velopmental stage.58 As its technology improved and the pub-
lic became more accustomed to its usage, the impact of televi-
sion on both the participants in the trial and the trial itself
might be lessened. 9 Thus, Harlan left the door open for the
Court to reevaluate the position taken in Estes at a later
49. Id. at 543-44.
50. Id. at 565 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
51. Id. at 535, 544, 549.
52. Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 589.
56. Id. at 588-90.
57. Id. at 590-91, 595.
58. Id. at 595.
59. Id.
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date. 0 Since Harlan's concurrence fell short of establishing a
constitutional rule on electronic media coverage, the Chandler
Court aligned Harlan's opinion with the four dissenting jus-
tices in Estes and held that Estes did not establish a constitu-
tional ban.e" Therefore, the Court said Estes need not be over-
ruled, and that, as long as such coverage did not violate due
process, the states should be free to experiment.6 2
Another significant recent case in the Court's recognition
of the press right to access to judicial proceedings was Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart.65 In this case, the Court held
that a protective order which prohibited the press from pub-
lishing or broadcasting stories of confessions or admissions
made by the accused was unconstitutional6 as a prior re-
straint.6 5 By allowing prior restraint, a court would be elevat-
ing sixth amendment rights above first amendment rights, a
priority some argue was not envisioned in the drafting of the
Constitution.6
. Moreover, prior restraint places the judge in a censorship
role,' 7 which is intolerable especially when alternatives exist.68
Although refusal to allow cameras in the courtroom is not
truly a prior restraint, because media coverage, including elec-
tronic media reporters without their equipment, is still per-
mitted, the effect is quite similar. Without the right to
pictoral coverage, it can be argued that television loses much
of its effectiveness. It only differs from newspapers in being a
visual and oral recitation rather than a written one.69
60. Id. at 595-96.
61. 101 S. Ct. at 809.
62. Id. at 813-14.
63. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
64. Id. at 541.
65. "A prior restraint is an order not to publish, while a closure order is an order
not to attend." Note, Public Trials and a First Amendment Right of Access: A Pre-
sumption of Openness, 60 NEB. L. REv. 169, 187 (1981). There is a presumption
against the constitutional validity of prior restraint. See, e.g., U.S. v. Washington
Post Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
U.S. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
67. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. Some of these alternatives to prior restraint are a change of venue, postpone-
ment of the trial, careful questioning of prospective jurors, clear jury instructions,
and jury sequestration. Id. at 563-64.
69. But see 381 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Two other recent Supreme Court cases regarding closed
courtrooms were not affected by Chandler, but they help flesh
out its parameters. In Gannett v. DePasquale,70 the Court
held that pre-trial hearings were separate and distinct from
the trial itself 1 and a press and public right of access did not
extend to them. 2 The Court maintained that the sixth
amendment's guarantee of a public trial was personal to the
accused and did not confer any rights upon the press.7 3 This
decision can be read narrowly to apply only to criminal pre-
trial hearings 4 and, therefore, did not have to be considered
in Chandler.
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia7 5 attempted to clarify
Gannett insofar as it addressed trials themselves.76 In Rich-
mond Newspapers, the Court held that an interference with
access to criminal trials abridges first amendment rights" and
defeats many of the goals of a public trial. 8
Because of the changing nature of society, today's popula-
tion generally does not glean information by first-hand obser-
vation; rather, people are dependent upon the media for infor-
mation.7 9 Therefore, the Richmond Newspapers Court found
that denying the press access to criminal trials effectively de-
nies the public's right to information." The Court said,
"[T]he First Amendment guarantees of speech and press,
standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing
courtroom doors . . . 81
Chandler reflects this view, not only by recognizing first
amendment guarantees but by refusing to summarily close the
70. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
71. Id. at 387-91.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 385-86.
74. The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 62, 65-66 (1979).
75. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
76. Denniston, Photo Finish, THE QUILL 20, 21 (1981).
77. 448 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78. Among the goals achieved by a public trial are the discouragement of perjury,
participant misconduct, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality. Id. at 569.
79. Id. at 573.
80. The Court noted that "[i]nstead of acquiring information about trials by
firsthand observation or by word of mouth from those who attended, people now ac-
quire it chiefly through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the
media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public." Id. at 573.
81. 448 U.S. at 576.
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courtroom doors to the electronic media.
IV. CRITIQUE
Chandler is based on the analysis that Estes did not find
electronic media coverage of criminal judicial proceedings per
se unconstitutional.8 2 The Chandler Court held that the pres-
ence of electronic media in the courtroom would not always
violate a defendant's due process rights and was not such a
violation in this case. Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct, Ca-
non 3A(7) left the door open for a defendant to prove such a
violation by showing that the media's coverage compromised
the jury or judge's ability to judge him fairly, or that it ad-
versely affected trial participants.8 3 Built into the Florida pro-
gram were rules which provided a record for appellate review
and pretrial hearings on the question of excluding the elec-
tronic media.84 These safeguards helped to insure a defen-
dant's rights. However, the burden of establishing prejudice
rests with the defendant.8 5 This may be difficult to substanti-
ate because, as the Court noted, empirical data has not
demonstrated conclusively that broadcast coverage has an ef-
fect on the judicial process."8
The Court neither endorsed nor invalidated Florida's ex-
periment,7 but affirmed the state's right to experiment,8 thus
reflecting a growing judicial trend towards a more traditional
federalism.89 Consistent with'this view of government, a state
is not required to admit cameras into the courtroom.
As established in the Florida experiment" and envisioned
by the Chandler Court, the trial judge would have wide dis-
cretion in controlling which participants are filmed and which
judicial proceedings are closed.9 1 The possibility exists that
82. 101 S. Ct. at 809.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 811.
85. Id. at 813.
86. Id. at 812; see Netteburg, Does Research Support the Estes Ban on Cameras
in the Courtroom?, 63 JUDICATURE 467 (1980) for a study on Wisconsin's experiment.
87. 101 S. Ct. at 813.
88. Id. at 814.
89. Id. at 812. The Court said: "This concept of federalism, echoed by the states
favoring Florida's experiment, must guide our decision."
90. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
91. Id. at 782.
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the judge could abuse this discretion, regardless of how well-
behaved the camera and sound crews may be, and bar their
access to the court.9 2 Judges may make this decision based on
what the electronic media does with its tapes, thus extending
a judge's domain and influence beyond the courtroom doors.9 3
This action can be rationalized as an attempt to gauge the
impact of broadcast coverage on the trial participants before
the bench,"' but can also be viewed as a serious infringement
on first amendment rights.
Still to be answered is the impact television will have on
the courts and the legal system.9 5 There can be no doubt that
electronic media coverage has had a tremendous impact in
other areas: "[ilt has reshaped politics, changed the nature of
sports and business, and transformed family life and the so-
cialization of children .... 96
Quite possibly, the Court's decision was partially moti-
vated by recent political events, such as the Watergate fiasco,
which have increased public skepticism of the democratic and
judicial processes. This erosion of public confidence may have
made an open judicial system even more important. As Jus-
tice Larsen said in a concurring opinion in Commonwealth v.
Hayes:
Human institutions have a tendency toward corruption; only
when certain checks and balances are permitted and/or im-
posed does this tendency become neutralized. The tendency
of corruption in the judiciary becomes greatest when the
public and the media (the public's eyes and ears) are ex-
cluded from judicial proceedings .... [T]he right of the
public and of the media to attend court proceedings must be
absolute.97
Although this decision allows the states to experiment
freely, "cameras remain banned from all trials in federal
courts, under rules which the United States Judicial Confer-
92. Denniston, Photo Finish, THE QUELL 20, 21 (1981).
93. Id. at 22.
94. Id.
95. Gerbner, Trial by Television: Are We at the Point of No Return?, 63 JUDICA-
TURE 417, 418 (1980).
96. Comstock, The Impact of Television on American Institutions, 28 J. OF COM.
12 (1978).
97. 489 Pa. 419, -, 414 A.2d 318, 328 (1980) (Larsen, J., concurring).
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ence (with Chief Justice Burger as chairman) reaffirmed only
last September."' 8 Thus the Chandler ruling appears limited
in impact to state courts although it "will accelerate moves to
allow cameras in the 22 states that forbid coverage by elec-
tronic media . . .,,9
SusAN ROSENBERG
98. Denniston, Photo Finish, THE QUILL 20, 21 (1981).
99. Cameras in the Courtroom, 67 A.B.A.J. 277 (March, 1981).
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